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BOOK REVIEW
RECORD. Edited by Nicholas Henry. Phoenix, Arizona: The Oryx Press, 1978COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC

79. Pp. 1955. $95.00.

Reviewed by L. Ray Patterson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1955, the Copyright Office commissioned the first in a series
of studies to produce recommendations for a general revision of
the copyright statute.' In 1976, a new copyright act was finally
passed and signed into law, taking effect on January 1, 1978.' This
twenty-one year interval resulted in a mass of public documents on
the subject of copyright, from which Nicholas Henry has made selections for a five-volume set, Copyright, Congress and Technology: The Public Record. The record is voluminous, and the fact
that the editor had to be selective in his choice of what to include
may lessen the value of the work for many persons. It is disappointing, for example, that not all of the Copyright Office studies
were included. The work does, however, include the final report of
the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Words
(CONTU), issued in 1978. This document is perhaps most symptomatic of the basic problem in copyright law today-how to accommodate the law of copyright to the development of new technology.
It is revealing that rather than delay the needed passage of a new
copyright act further, Congress legislated the status quo for copyright in conjunction with computers and authorized CONTU. The
charge to the Commission was
to study and compile data on: (1) the reproduction and use of copyrighted

works of authorship-(A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of
* Visiting Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Professor of Law, Emory
University School of Law. A.B., 1949, Mercer University;, M.A., 1950, Northwestern University; LL.B., 1957, Mercer University;, S.J.D., 1966, Harvard University.
1. Thirty-five studies were prepared. They are reproduced in THE COPYRIGHT SocIETY

oF THE U.S.A., STunxS ON COPYRIGHT (Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 1963).
2.
3.

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS, AND TECHNOLOGG. THE PUBLIC REcoRD (N. Henry ed. 1978-

79).
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storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information, and (B) by various forms of machine reproduction, not including reproduction by or at the
request of instructors for use in face-to-face teaching activities; and (2) the
creation of new works by the application or intervention of such automatic
systems or machine reproduction. 4

This charge raised the most fundamental issue in copyright
law: what is the function of copyright? If this simple question
could be satisfactorily answered, the problem of the protection to
be extended to computer programs and machine-made works, and
against photocopying, would be more tractable than it has proved
to be. The difficulty with the question, of course, is the assumption
that the function of copyright is both known and understood. The
copyright clause of the Constitution states that copyright's function is "to promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive right to their ...
Writings .... ,5 Thus, if "science" is understood to mean knowl-

edge, the purpose of copyright is to promote knowledge by rewarding authors for their efforts.
The constitutional basis of this purpose gives it something of
the force of Holy Writ, but it does not comport with reality. First,
copyright is not limited to authors. If the author is an employee for
hire, the "author" then is his employer, who may be an individual,
a partnership, or a corporation. 6 Second, the author may assign his
copyright and thereby confer all of his rights upon his assignee.7
Third, it can hardly be argued that "statuettes, book ends, clocks,
lamps, door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy
banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and
ash trays" contribute in any meaningful way to the promotion of
knowledge, though they freely receive the imprimatur of
copyright.8
The copyright clause notwithstanding, the enactment and interpretation of the various copyright statutes over the years' have
4. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873. See 17 U.S.C. § 117
(Supp. HI 1979).
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. IH 1979). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. II 1979) (definition of "work made for hire").
7. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (Supp. 11 1979). The exception to this statement is the termination right of the author, which cannot be alienated. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (Supp. m 1979).
8. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring).
9. In addition to individual amendments, there have been four general revisions of the
copyright statute, including the 1976 revision. The earlier ones were in 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat,
436; in 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; and in 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
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resulted in the trivialization of copyright. Thus, Betty Boop dolls, 10
for example, come within the protection of the copyright statute,
as do telephone directories,"" which contribute little to the culture
of our society or the promotion of knowledge. This is not to say
that Betty Boop dolls and telephone directories do not deserve the
protection of copyright or even that the process of trivialization is
necessarily bad. It is to say that copyright law simply has grown.
II. THE

GROWTH OF COPYRIGHT AND THE

1976 ACT

The growth of copyright law can be seen in the enlargement of
the scope of its subject matter from "books, maps and charts," in
the Copyright Act of 179012 to "original works of authorship" in
the 1976 Act.13 The expanded coverage in the 1976 Act, of course,
is primarily a product of technology. Yet it is somewhat surprising
to note that after the invention of the printing press, which gave
rise to copyright, the first change in copyright law to accommodate
new technology was the provision made three hundred years later
in 1865 for the copyright of photographs and negatives. 1 ' Since
then, however, Congress has been reluctant to accommodate copyright law to new technology, perhaps because it has shared the
view of the courts that traditionally have cast a jaundiced eye on
copyright as a necessary monopoly to be construed strictly."" Thus,
in the general revision of the Copyright Act in 1870,16 Congress
attempted to limit the copyright of artistic works to works of fine
art. (Justice Holmes summarily dispatched this limitation to the
archives of irrelevancy by interpreting the Act to provide protection for a circus poster. 17 ) Moreover, in 1909, Congress refused to
grant copyright for sound recordings, and it was not until 1972
that recordings were granted some form of protection.18 Even then
the copyright protection was limited and these limitations were
carried forward in the 1976 Act. 19 Relatedly, although Congress in
10. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freudlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934).
11. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
12. Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 11 1979).
14. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540.
15. This judicial skepticism was evinced in the first Supreme Court case on copyright,
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
16. Ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198.
17. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
18. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (Supp. 1II 1979). The copyright of a sound recording protects
against duplication, not imitation.
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1912 readily granted copyright protection for motion pictures,20 it
never provided copyright protection for radio broadcasts, and until
the 1976 Act, the Copyright Office provided protection for television programs only by analogizing them to motion pictures.
The reluctance of Congress to extend copyright protection to
the products of new technology can be understood because copyright itself was the product of a particular technology, the printing
press. Thus, almost every work given copyright protection over the
years could exist in printed form-maps, charts, books, musical
compositions, etchings, prints, and dramas. Even photographs and
negatives were printed, and motion pictures were, after all, a form
of photographs. Sound recordings and the like, however, simply
could not be analogized to any kind of printed work.
The 1976 Act thus is a genuinely revolutionary document in
extending full copyright protection beyond the realm of printing. I
suggest, however, that the 1909 Act was just as revolutionary as
the recent legislation, though in a different way and for different
reasons. Congress in that act perhaps unwittingly enlarged the
scope of the copyright monopoly by making the right to copy one
of the exclusive rights of the copyright proprietor. Those exclusive
rights in the 1909 Act were "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and
vend."2 1 Concerning this new language, the House Report stated:
"Subsection (a) of Section 1 adopts without change the phraseology of section 4952 of the Revised Statutes, and this, with the insertion of the word 'copy,' practically adopts the phraseology of the
first copyright act Congress ever passed-that of 1790. ' 'a2 The inclusion of the exclusive right to copy, however, was a significant
change in regard to books. Although the right to copy had long
been a part of the copyright statute, the right had not applied to
books-a point first made by Verner Clapp in a study prepared for
the National Advisory Commission on Libraries. 3
The argument that the exclusive right to copy given in the
1909 Act constituted an unwitting expansion of the rights of the
copyright proprietor of books rests upon an analysis of the use of
the word "copy" in the statutory predecessors of that act. In the
1790 Act, the exclusive rights granted to the copyright proprietor
were to print, reprint, publish, and vend the copyrighted work, but
20.
21.
22.
23.

Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
V. CLAPP, CoPyRiOT-A IBRARiAN's Vmw 25-28 (1968).
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only maps, charts, and books could be copyrighted.2 ' The conduct
justified by the grant of these rights, however, was distinguished
from conduct that constituted infringement. Thus, anyone who
"shall print, reprint, publish, or import. . any copy or copies of
such map, chart, book or books" without the consent of the copyright proprietor, or shall sell such work, was guilty of
25
infringement.
The distinction between the "rights" section and the "infringement" section is important analytically, for it was characteristic of the statutes until the Act of 1909. The amendment of 1802,
for example, provided copyright protection for prints, and in its
infringement section provided that anyone who "shall engrave,
etch or work. . or in any other manner copy or sell. . . print, reprint, or import for sale" the copyrighted prints was guilty of infringement. 2 This use of the verb "copy" was the first in the copyright statutes.
The conduct that constituted an infringement of the copyright
of books continued to be printing, publishing, selling, and importing without the authority of the copyright proprietor, while the infringement of the copyright of other kinds of works continued to
include copying.2 7 This distinction was true even in the 1870 revision28 in which all the works subject to copyright and the rights
granted in connection with them were assimilated into one section.2 9 The 1909 Act, however, did not define infringing conduct,
and with the addition of the exclusive right to copy, the new statute was interpreted to mean that the exclusive right to copy applied to all works, including books.
The comment in the House Report on the addition of the ex24. Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
25. Id. § 2.
26. Ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 171.
27. See §§ 6-7 of the 1831 Revision, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
28. See §§ 99-100 of the 1870 Revision, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
29. See. 86. And be it further enacted, That any citizen of the United States, or
resident therein, who shall be the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book,
map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or
negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or
designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts, and his executors, administrators, or assigns, shall, upon complying with the provisions of this act, have the sole
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing,
and vending the same; and in the case of dramatic composition, of publicly performing
or representing it, or causing it to be performed or represented by others; and authors
may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own works. Ch. 230, 16 Stat.
198.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:833

clusive right to copy, implying as it does no substantial change, can
best be characterized as disingenuous.3 0 Prior to the 1909 Act, it
seems clear that the copyright proprietor of a book had an exclusive right to copy his work only for commercial purposes. Thus, in
his classic treatise in 1879, Eaton Drone wrote that the doctrine of
fair use "is a recognized principle that every author, compiler, or
publisher may make certain uses of a copyrighted work, in the
' 1 A literal reading of
preparationof a rival or other publication."
the exclusive right to copy, however, has led to the inexorable conclusion that any copying of a copyrighted work, even by an individual for his own use, may constitute infringement. Even the phraseology of the 1909 Act, however, did not require this result. One of
the striking characteristics of all the copyright statutes is the emphasis that they place on the right to sell the work. Thus, a reasonable reading of section 1(a) would have established the right to
print and sell, the right to reprint and sell, the right to publish and
sell, and the right to copy and sell. The courts did not choose to
give the statute this reading, however, perhaps because the defendant in copyright cases was almost always a competitor, not an individual user.
My point is not that the enlargement of the scope of copyright
by the inclusion of the exclusive right to copy was good or bad, but
that it was unwitting and that it changed the concept of copyright.
With the advent of the exclusive right to copy books as a right
distinct from the right to print, reprint, or publish them, the concept of copyright ceased to be viewed primarily as a concept of
monopoly. Instead, it came to be perceived as a proprietary concept reflecting principles of property. Paradoxically, the change enhanced the monopoly of copyright. It is one thing to prohibit the
copying of a book by a competitor, which was consistent with the
law prior to 1909; it is another to prohibit copying from a book by
an individual user for his own private purposes, which was not consistent with the law prior to 1909. Thus, copyright no longer
merely gave control for profit, but gave full control of the copy30. Ironically, so far from "retain[ing] without change" the old phraseology, the committees (the House of Representatives and the Senate shared the same report) were introducing a word that was new in the context and that nearly 60 years later has not been
construed. Through it the copyright proprietors, without seeking it and apparently quite by

accident, acquired at least the semblance of a right of an activity that was to have increasing
importance in the new century. V. CLAPP,supra note 23, at 27.
31. E. DRONE, A TRATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPMRTY ININTELECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 386
(1879) (emphasis added).
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righted work itself. The fears of monopoly that had accompanied
the early history of copyright had faded, and this change in the
concept of copyright prepared the way for the 1976 Act. If copyright is a proprietary concept used to protect the profit to be
gained from publishing a book, no reason exists not to extend the
concept to protect the profit to be gained from all original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
The monopolistic characteristics of copyright, however, were
by no means overlooked by the draftsmen of the 1976 Act. Indeed,
a substantial portion of the statute deals with limitations on the
exclusive rights of the copyright proprietor. One of the continuing
problems in copyright law is the balancing of the interests of the
copyright proprietor with those of the user of the copyrighted
work. This problem has been made unduly complex by the fiction
that copyright is an author's right. This notion has resulted in confusion about the function of copyright, which, I suggest, is trade
regulation. Thus, if copyright is a right of the author for his own
protection, it is difficult to view the function of copyright as a
trade regulation device, because an author should have more than
just economic rights in works that he creates. As Holmes stated,
"Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has
in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone."32' Moreover,
the notion of copyright as an author's right suggests that copyright
policy involves the interest of only two groups: authors and users.
There are, however, three groups whose interests must be reconciled: authors, publishers/entrepreneurs, and users.
So long as the publisher is omitted from the equation, the constitutionally mandated function of copyright to promote learning
by rewarding authors makes sense. As suggested above, however,
this function of copyright does not accord with reality. As history
demonstrates, copyright was originally developed by and for publishers, and the author did not become a part of the equation until
the concept had matured.33 The author entered the picture in the
English Copyright Act of 1710, known as the Statute of Anne,
which was entitled, "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,
by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned." 3' The
32.

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).

33.

See L. PATTRS0N, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968), for a detailed

treatment of the early history of copyright.
34. Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, c. 19.
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copied this English act.

III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND MISCONCEPTIONS
The Statute of Anne is commonly called the first copyright act
in Anglo-American history, a half-truth that has obscured the earlier history of copyright. It was the first Parliamentary statute devoted exclusively to copyright, but it was also a successor to other
legislation representing a hundred and fifty year history of copyright that includes Star Chamber decrees,3 8 Ordinances during the
Interregnum, 7 and the Licensing Act of 1662.38 Without an understanding of this historical background, a proper understanding of
the Statute of Anne, if not impossible, is at least highly
improbable.
The Anglo-American copyright was originally a product of the
Stationers' Company, a London company of the book trade, which
had a monopoly of printing and publishing due to a royal charter
granted in 1557.39 The primary motivation in the grant of the charter was to make the company an effective instrument of censorship
and press control, a motive in which the stationers acquiesced
without compunction.'0 In order to protect their monopoly, the
stationers were more than willing to assist the government in seeking out and destroying secret presses to prevent seditious books or
pamphlets.
The primary concern of the stationers, of course, was their
property, which depended upon the maintenance of good order
within the company. Having a monopoly of printing and publishing, their problem was inside rather than outside piracy. The government, on the other hand, was not concerned with the proprietary rights of the stationers and thus permitted them to control
their own destiny in this regard. The method by which the stationers maintained their position was the registration of their copies in
the company register books, which gave the member who regis35. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
36. The two major decrees were the Star Chamber Decree of 1586 and the Star Chamber Decree of 1637. The two decrees are reproduced in L. PATrTRSON, supra note 33, at
Appendix II.
37. The major ordinances regulating the press during the Interregnum were the Ordinances of 1643 and 1645, and the Act of 1649. See C. FmRTH & R. RArt, I AcTs & ORDNANczs
OF THE INTERREGNUM 184-87, 1021-23 (1911); H id. 245-54.
38. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33.
39. The Charter is reproduced in I E. ARBER, A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE
COMPANY

OF STATIONERS,

1544-1640 A.D. xxviii (1875).

40. See generally C.

BLAGDEN,

THE STATIONERS'

CoMPANY

(1960).

1981]

BOOK REVIEW

tered his copy the exclusive right to publish the work. 4 1 Since registration was limited to members of the company, there was no
question of an author's copyright because authors were not members. How a stationer acquired the manuscript that he registered
was not a concern of the company. Once acquired, however, the
copyright existed in perpetuity and led to an offensive and opprobrious monopoly of the book trade by a few booksellers who main42
tained control by selling their copyrights only to each other.
The various statutes of censorship gave the stationers' copyright legal efficacy through provisions that forbade the printing of
works contrary to the stationers' copyright as well as without the
licensor's imprimatur. The most notable of these acts was the Licensing Act of 1662,' s modeled after the Star Chamber Decree of
1637," which had expired with the demise of the Star Chamber in
1640. 4 The Licensing Act itself expired by its own terms periodically, but was renewed several times until 1694 when Parliament
refused to renew it. Parliament's objection, however, was not to
censorship as much as to the booksellers' monopoly. When their
efforts to renew the Licensing Act failed, the monopolists sought to
obtain the passage of a copyright act per se, but failed in this effort
in both 1703 and 1706.46 They finally resorted to urging the passage of a copyright act to protect authors rather than themselves.
This stratagem succeeded, resulting in the Statute of Anne.
An analysis of the Statute of Anne, however, shows that the
copyright provided was not so much a protection for the author as
a trade regulation device. It did enable authors for the first time to
secure a statutory copyright for their works, but this effect was
only because the statute enabled anyone to acquire a statutory
copyright.'7 The important change was not that authors could now
acquire copyright, but that copyright was no longer limited to
members of the Stationers' Company-a blow against the monopolists. Indeed, the only right in the statute unique to the author was
the privilege of renewing the copyright, if he were living at the end
41. See E.
42.
(1926).

ARBER,

supra note 39.

Gray, Alexander Donaldson and the Fight for Cheap Books, 38 JuDicIL REv. 180

43. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33.
44. See note 36 supra.
45. 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (1640).
46. See XIV H.C. Joup. 249, 278, 287 and XV H.C. JouR. 313.
47. The right to secure copyright was given to the author and his "Assignee or Assigns." Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1.
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of the first term, for a second term of fourteen years." This right is
the predecessor of the termination right in the 1976 Act. The limitation of the renewal right to the author was a benefit to him, but
it was also antimonopolistic in effect. It meant that the assignee of
the author, the bookseller, could not renew the copyright.
The new statute gave consideration to the existing stationers'
copyrights by continuing them for twenty-one years.4 9 This provision may explain why the statute also contained an elaborate provision for regulating the prices of books, providing for remedies to
be granted by various officials if the price of a book was excessive. 50 Interestingly, the named officials were substantially the
same as those who had been named as licensing authorities in the
Licensing Act of 1662 and the Star Chamber Decree of 1637.
Despite its intended function as a trade regulation device, the
Statute of Anne actually had little immediate effect on the booksellers' monopoly. This impotence was partly because their old
copyrights were continued for twenty-one years and partly because
the booksellers simply continued to require that authors assign
their copies to them. Eventually, however, the monopolists had to
realize that the statutory copyright did not exist in perpetuity as
had the old stationers' copyright. In their efforts to perpetuate
their monopoly in spite of the limitations of the statutory copyright, the monopolists turned to a frequent refuge for legal scoundrels who find themselves in a statutory bind-judicial interpretation. Once again, the monopolists sought succor with their most
sympathetic argument, the rights of the author. The author, they
claimed, in addition to the statutory copyright, had a common law
copyright in perpetuity by reason of his creation. Not so coincidentally, the author could assign this common law copyright to the
bookseller, perpetuity and all. The monopolists' purpose, of course,
was to revive the stationers' copyright in the guise of a common
law copyright.
The booksellers almost succeeded. Indeed they got the result
they wanted in Millar v. Taylor51 in 1768. In that case the Court of
King's Bench ruled that the author did have a common law copyright existing in perpetuity-the Statute of Anne notwithstanding-and that he could assign this copyright to a bookseller. Fortunately, the Millar case did not prevail, and the last word was left
48. Id. § 11.

49. Id. § 1.
50. Id. §4.
51. 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1768).
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to the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett.52 An author, said
the Lords, did indeed have a common law copyright in his works.
This common law right existed only until publication, however, at
which point the author must look for protection to the statutory
copyright provided by the Statute of Anne. Thus, the stationers'
copyright for publishers came to be recognized as an author's copyright through statutes and judicial interpretation without any substantial change in the function of copyright.
The confusion over copyright created by the monopolists in
England was transported to this country and promoted by treatise
writers intent on establishing a theoretical basis for literary property. George Ticknor Curtis, for example, in A Treatise on the Law
3 devoted the first twenty-five
of Copyright,"
pages of his book to
the "Theory of the Rights of Authors." He argued that the author's rights in his property were based in natural law and existed
in perpetuity. 54 While Drone took a similar view,55 the practice,
nevertheless, was that copyright had developed and continued to
protect the publisher.
The aftermath is still with us in the guise of the fiction that
copyright is intended primarily to protect the author. An examination of the customs of the publishing industry in this country
would reveal that by far the majority of copyrights are held by
publishers. The author is protected only by contract-usually adhesion contracts. Thus, the author in 1981 has no greater protection than John Milton had in 1667 when he assigned the "Copy, or
Manuscript of a Poem entitled Paradise Lost,... now lately Licensed to be printed" to Samuell Simmons for five pounds, a sum
that was to be increased to a total of seventy pounds if sales of the
work warranted it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This early history of copyright would be of little more than
antiquarian interest except that it demonstrates the source of the
confusion regarding the function of copyright. Although generally
viewed as a right of the author, copyright has continued to function as a trade regulation device. Before the advent of computers
and copying machines, this point was of relatively little impor52.

2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).

53. G.
54.
55.

CUTIs,

A

TRETSE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT

Id. at 23.
See E. DRONE, supra note 31.

(1847).
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tance, but IBM and Xerox have complicated copyright law enormously. Thus, in attempting to isolate the issues, it is helpful to
view the law of copyright as statutorily creating unfair competition
based on the doctrine of misappropriation. It is both monopolistic
and antimonopolistic in that it is a trade regulation concept intended to protect legitimate property rights while preventing the
expansion of those rights into an unwarranted monopoly. Indeed,
the new copyright act reflects this function in several ways. It prohibits copyright for ideas,5 6 contains compulsory licensing provisions,51 and provides for extensive limitations on the exclusive
rights of the copyright proprietor 8 -primarily, the doctrine of fair
use.

59

Modern communication technology has far outstripped copyright as an author's right, and the time has come to reassess the
concept. The obstacle, of course, is the author, who is recognized as
having a special kind of interest in the works that he creates beyond the economic interest associated with property. This interest
is recognized in the form of the moral right of the author in civil
law countries, particularly France and Germany.6 0 This moral right
includes the right of the author to protect the integrity of his work
and his reputation in connection with the use of the work and can
be characterized as a personal as opposed to a proprietary right.
History is helpful in understanding the rejection of the doctrine of moral right in the common law countries. A major reason
is Millar v. Taylor,61 recognizing the author's common law copyright as existing separate and apart from the statutory copyright.
Lord Mansfield in that case was in effect giving recognition to the
moral rights of the author, and this was, I believe, what he intended the common law copyright to be. He made, however, a major conceptual error. He could not, or would not, distinguish between the personal and the proprietary rights of the author.
Consequently, his recognition of the author's common law copyright protected the monopoly of the booksellers. When the issue
came before the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett," the re56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. 1I 1979).
57.
58.
59.
60.

17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116, 118 (Supp. III 1979).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (Supp. 1I 1979).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1979).
See Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author (1959), Study 4 of the Copyright
Office Studies, reprinted in THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A., 11 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT

963 (Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 1963).

61.
62.

4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1768).
2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
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sentment against the booksellers' monopoly prevailed. The Lords
recognized that the author had a common law copyright, but only
until his work was published.
These two cases explain the confused concept of copyright, for
they meant that copyright was to be a concept that encompassed
both proprietary and personal rights. The notion that copyright is
to protect the author's personal rights has continually served as a
rationalization for enlarging the proprietary rights of the copyright
proprietor, more to the benefit of the publisher than the author.
The importance of the distinction between proprietary and
personal rights in connection with copyright did not become apparent until the development of modern communication technology. For example, copyright for computers, reproduction by photocopying, and copyright for television are problems that involve
proprietary rather than personal rights. By definition, the corporate copyright proprietor can have no personal rights. More important perhaps, the 1976 Copyright Act eliminated the common law
copyright, and the only protection that the author now has is statutory. 3 There is much to be said for the elimination of the dual
system of copyright protection in this country, but the change was
almost surely made to accommodate copyright to television. Needless to say, technology will undoubtedly continue to shape the law
of copyright.
The time has come when it is not only feasible but desirable to
make the distinction that Lord Mansfield failed to make in Millar-the distinction between a proprietary and a personal copyright. Indeed, the 1909 and 1976 copyright statutes suggest that
the law of copyright in this country is taking this direction. The
work-made-for-hire doctrine, first codified in the 1909 Act," under
which an employer is deemed the author for copyright purposes,
implies a proprietary copyright that should be treated differently
from the copyright of an individual author's work. Thus, the term
of such a copyright is not the life of the author plus fifty years, but
either seventy-five years from publication or one hundred years
from creation.0 5 Moreover, the termination right does not apply to
works made for hire. 6 The limited rights available to the copyright of a sound recording suggest that it is a proprietary copyright, and the various compulsory licenses also suggest the trend to
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a purely proprietary copyright.
The trend, however, has apparently not been recognized and
thus is not counterbalanced by the parallel development of a personal copyright for the individual author. Presumably, this omission is because copyright is deemed to be an author's right in the
first place. As suggested above, however, this theory is not consistent with practice. The proprietary copyright is developing at the
expense of the author's personal rights.
The recognition of an individual author's personal copyright
would have substantial merit in itself. Its principal value, however,
would be to provide a sounder perspective for copyright law. It
would dispel the fiction that copyright law as it presently functions
serves primarily to protect the author. Both legislative and judicial
lawmakers would thereby be in a better position to bring the issues
more sharply into focus by recognizing the proprietary copyright as
a concept of trade regulation for intellectual property, while still
providing appropriate protection for the rights of the individual
author. The problems of copyright for computers, fair use in photocopying, and copyright for television could then be approached
in a much more realistic manner. That in itself would be no small
feat.

